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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1954
were "in employment" as required by RCW 50.04.100. In concluding that the taxpayer'
could not claim exception under the provisions of RCW 50.04.140, the Court noted
that the only freezers sold by the salesmen were those of the taxpayer and stressed
the fact that, although the taxpayer did not in fact exercise extensive control over the
actions of the salesmen, he did possess the right to, control their activities.
TORTS
Malpractice - Limitation of Action in Malpractice Suits. The
recent case of Lindquist v. Mullen' presented the problem of when the
cause of action accrues in malpractice actions predicated upon negli-
gence. The defendant left a surgical sponge in a hernia incision in
February, 1946, but continued to treat the plaintiff till October, 1949.
It was not until March, 1953, that the plaintiff discovered her suffering
was caused by the presence of the surgical sponge. The charges were
negligence in performance .of the operation, and in the diagnosis and
treatment subsequent to the injury. The court held that the action
was barred by the- three-year statute of limitation.2
Although seemingly unjust, this decision is in accord with the
general rule that the mere fact the plaintiff is not aware of her cause
of action for malpractice does not suspend the running of the statute
of limitation.' The cause of actioi for malpractice accrues at the time
of the physician's wrongful act or omission and not from the time the
patient first discovers it.
However, an exception to this general rule has been recognized in
most jurisdictions. This exception is based on the theory that where
a party is guilty of fraudulent concealment so as to prevent the injured
party from obtaining knowledge thereof, the statute of limitation does
not start to run until the cause of action is discovered or-might have
been discovered through reasonable diligence. Among these jurisdic-
tions, however, there is considerable confusion as to what constitutes
fraudulent concealment. Some take the view that an affirmative act
of concealment on the part of the physician is necessary,' while others
recognize mere knowledge and failure to disclose to the patient the
fact of injury as fraudulent.5 Still another view employs the rationale
1145 Wash. Dec. 629, 277 P2d 724 (1954).
2 RCW 4.16.080 (2).
8 74 A.L.R. 1318 (1931) ; 144 A.L.R. 209 (1943).
4 Carrol v. Peyton, 138 S.W2d 878 (Civ. App. Tex. 1940) ; Brown v. Grinstead,
212 Mo. App. 533, 252 S.W. 973 (1923).5 Picket v. Arlinsky (C.C.A. 4th), 110 F2d 628 (1940) ; Bervath v. LeFever 325
Pa. 43, 189 A. 542 (1937).
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that knowledge is not an essential element of fraudulent concealment
because of the confidential relationship between the parties.'
Conceding the rule to be established that lack of knowledge by the
patient does not toll the statute, the obvious question arises as to the
result had the plaintiff alleged in her complaint that the defendant
fraudulently concealed her cause of action from her. The case of
McCoy v. Stephens,7 cited with approval in the instant case, seemingly
can be construed to hold that Washington has repudiated this excep-
tion. In that case it was alleged that after receiving serious burns as
a result of negligent X-ray treatments, the defendant, while continuing
to treat her for a period of years, fraudulently assured her that the
burns were merely superficial. Adopting the rule laid down in several
malpractice actions against attorneys that the defendant's concealment
of the malpractice does not toll the statute,' the court held that since
the gist of the plaintiff's grievance was the negligent act of the physician
and not the defendant's subsequent failure to disclose, the action was
barred by the same three-year statute of limitation.
Furthermore, the language employed in the instant case would also
appear to foreclose any recognition of this exception. While the statute
is not definitive as to when the cause of action accrues in malpractice
suits, the court, though not confronted with the question of fraud,
reasoned that since the legislature took positive action to provide a
specific exemption to the running of the statute in certain fraud cases,
it did not intend this exemption to embrace malpractice cases, saying,
"It is not our prerogative to do so." Apparently the basis of the court's
position on this controversial question is its reluctance to engraft
implied exceptions onto the express wording of the statute. The
necessary conclusion is that doctors and dentists guilty of malpractice
in Washington may now rest secure in the statute so long as their
patients remain ignorant of their cause of actions for the prescribed
statutory period.
Absolute Liability-Extent of Liability for Ultrahazardous Acti-
vities. In Foster v. Preston Mill Co.,9 blasting operations of the
defendant two and one-half miles distant from the plaintiff's mink
6 Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W2d 503 (1934) ; Wood v. Anderson, 60 Ga.
App. 262, 35 S.E.2d 788 (1937).
7 182 Wash. 55, 44 P.2d 797 (1935).
8 Cornwell v. Edsen, 78 Wash. 662, 139 Pac. 602 (1914); Jones v. Gregory, 125
Wash. 46, 215 Pac. 63 (1923) ; Smith v. Berkey, 134 Wash. 348, 235 Pac. 793 (1925).
9 44 Wn.2d 440, 268 P2d 645 (1954).
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farm frightened a mother mink and caused her to kill her kittens,'0
wherein liability was sought to be imposed on the theory of absolute
liability.1 In denying recovery, the court was called upon to determine
the extent of liability under that theory. 2 Adopting the test of the
Restatement of Torts,8 the court held that the injury was not within
the risk created by the defendant's ultrahazardous activity.
Although the application of this test by the Washington court to
limit liability is new, the rule that liability extends only to foreseeable
consequences of hazardous activities is consistent with previous Wash-
ington cases, since the basis and justification for absolute liability stems
from the hazard created to those in the vicinity. While this result is
reached by various theories, 4 prior Washington cases have obtained
this result by refusing to recognize the activity of the defendant as
ultrahazardous. 5  This compels the plaintiff to predicate his action
on a theory of negligence or nuisance, which therefore, subjects 'that
action to the limitations of proximate cause or balancing the interests.
The court, however, by way of dictum, pointed out that even had
the injury been foreseeable, recovery would have been denied since
1... the policy of the law does not impose the rule of strict liability to
protect against harms incident to the plaintiff's extraordinary and
unusual use of land." What the court means by this policy is not
altogether clear. A literal reading of this dictum would indicate that
10 For a discussion of the somewhat eccentric habits of female mink, see Hamilton
v. King County, 195 Wash. 84, 79 P2d 697 (1938).
"7 The theory of absolute liability is associated with Rylands v. Fletcher, (1886)
L. R. Ex. 265, aff'd, Fletcher v. Rylands, (1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330., that a lafnd-owner
who artificially accumulates water upon his premises is absolutely liable for damages
caused by its escape. This case has been overruled by name in Anderson v. Rucker
Brothers, 107 Wash. 595, 183 Pac. 70, aff'd on rehearing, 107 Wash. 604, 186 Pac. 293
(1919).
12 The Washington court has accepted the theory of absolute liability for injuries
caused by the use of explosives irrespective of negligence-it is an ultrahazardous
activity which is carried on at peril. Patrick v Smith, 75 Wash. 407, 134 Pac. 1076
(1913) ; Schade Brewing Co. v. C.M. & P.S. Ry., 79 Wash. 651, 140 Pac. 897 (1914).
13 3 RE-sTATEmENT, TORTS, 41 § 519 (1938). "Except as stated in §§ 521.4, one who
carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels
the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of
the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahaz-
ardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent harm."
"4 Madison v. East Jordan Irr. Co., 101 Utah 552, 125 P.2d 794 (1942). Under facts
similar to those in the instant case, recovery was denied, on the ground that the
mother mink's intervention broke the chain of causation.
15 orepsch v. Donald, 4 Wash. 436. 30 Pac. 991 (1892). The court held that the
theory of absolute liability is inapplicable to persons whose prermses are- at such a
distance that there is no reason to expect they will be damaged by blasting activities.
Kendall v. Johnson, 51 Wash. 477, 99 Pac. 310. (1909). Blasting is not -inherintly
dangerous when done so far away from human habitation that- injury could not be
foreseen.
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the plaintiff's conduct must also be of sufficient utility to outweigh the
foreseeable consequences of the defendant's hazardous activity.
JAMES A. FJRBER
Wrongful Death-Defenses Available to the Tortfeasor. In the
case of Johnson v. Ottomeir,8 the court again explored the question
of whether the right of a decedent's representative to maintain an
action for wrongful death under RCW 4.20.010 is dependent upon the
right of the decedent to have maintained such an action had he sur-
vived. In this case a husband murdered his wife and then committed
suicide. The defendant was appointed administrator of both estates.
The plaintiff, a son of the murdered wife, brought this action to have
himself appointed administrator with will annexed of the estate of his
mother. The son's contention was that a cause of action for wrongful
death existed in his mother's estate against the estate of her husband
which the defendant could not prosecute, being executrix of both
estates. The defendant argued that under the Washington court's
interpretation of the wrongful death statute, the tortfeasor, or in this
case the tortfeasor's estate, had the benefit of any defenses which might
have been available to him in an action brought by the decedent had
she survived; and because of the immunity from suit between husband
and wife for torts committed against the person during coverture7 the
decedent could not have maintained an action; therefore, none can be
brought by her estate. The complaint was dismissed in the trial court.
In an en banc decision, with one dissenting justice, the Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's dismissal, and thus for the first time
recognized a cause of action for wrongful death as existing in favor of
a decedent's estate where the decedent would have had no remedy in an
action brought by himslf. Recognizing the apparent inconsistency
between this decision and the earlier expressed rule that "all defenses
available to the defendant, if the action had been brought by the person
injured, prior to his death, are available to the defendant in an action
brought by his personal representative to recover damages for his
death,"" the court attempts to distinguish this case from others in
which the problem has arisen. The basis of this distinction the court
finds to be in the nature of the defense which has been asserted in the
previous cases where the existence of a cause of action has been denied.
These defenses the court places into two major categories.
1- 145 Wash. Dec. 391, 275 P.2d 723 (1954).
17 Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629 (1911).
is Ostheller v. Spokane & Inland Empire R. Co., 107 Wash. 678, 182 Pac. 630 (1919).
[MAY
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First, there are defenses which the court finds to "inhere in the
tort"' that is, defenses which are related to the tortious conduct in
such a way as to prevent its being a death resulting from a "wrongful
act or neglect" within the court's interpretation of the statute. In-
cluded in this category the court finds contributory negligence,"0 self-
defense,2' consent,22 and the relationship of host and guest under
Washington's host-guest statute.2 Where these defenses are present
the court has held that there has been no breach of duty owing to the
decedent, and hence it is not a death by wrongful act or neglect, and
no action is maintainable.
The second category of defenses which will be available to the
tortfeasor, according to this opinion, exists where the conduct of the
decedent following injury, but prior to his death, was such that he
would have been precluded from bringing an action himself while alive.
Included within this category are cases -in which the decedent has
given a release and satisfaction to the tortfeasor" as well as those in
which the decedent has allowed the statute of limitations to run on the
.original injury while he was still alive.2
The defense of husband-wife immunity asserted in the Johnson
case, the court finds, is included in neither of these categories. It exists
merely by virtue of the disability of the wife to bring suit. Such dis-
ability, being personal to her, terminates on her death, there being no
valid reason for allowing its assertion in an action maintained by her
representative.
Despite the liberalized interpretation of the wrongful death statute
in the instant case, the opinion indicates that for most purposes the
court will continue to treat the statute as conferring a remedy more in
the nature of a survival action rather than as granting a new cause
of action in favor of the decedent's estate. In most cases the action will
still apparently be subject to all the defenses which might have been
raised against the decedent. The only exception to this appears to be
in that limited area where the court finds what it terms a "personal
defense" present. It is submitted that in a wrongful death action
19 The court seems to derive this conception of defenses which inhere in the tort
from the decision of the Pennsylvania court in Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa.
438, 184 Atl. 663 (1936).
20 Ostheller v. Spokane & Inland Empire R Co., supra note 18.
21 Welh v. Creech, 88 Wash. 429, 153 Pac. 355 (1915).
22 Hart v. Geysel, 159 Wash. 632, 294 Pac. 570 (1930).
28 Upcl urch v. Hubbard, 29 Wn.2d 559, 188 P.2d 82 (1947).
24 Brodie v. Washington Water Power Co., 92 Wash. 574, 159 Pac. 791 (1916).
25 Calhoun v. Washington Veneer Co., 170 Wash. 152, 15 P.2d 943 (1932). Grant v.
Fisher Fiburing Mills Co., 181 Wash. 576, 44 P.2d 193 (1935).
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brought under a statute as exists in Washington the only valid defenses
should be those, such as self-defense and consent, which prevent the
defendant's conduct from being tortious at all. All of the others dis-
cussed by the court are, in fact, as personal to the decedent as the
defense of husband-wife immunity. They operate merely to prevent
the decedent's recovery and do not prevent the conduct of the de-
fendant from being tortious. If, as the court states, the wrongful death
statute does create a new cause of action in favor of the decedent's
estate and not merely a survival action, there seems little reason to
limit the statute's application in the way the court suggests.
ROBFRT E. DIXON
Affrmative Defenses--Voluntary Assumption of Risk-Volenti Non Fit Injura. In
Ewer v. Johnson, 44 Wn2d 746, 270 P2d 813 (1954), and in Kingwell v. Hart, 145
Wash. Dec. 372, 275 P.2d 431 (1954), the court again reiterated the distinction between
the affirmative defenses of assumption of risk and the maxim, volenti non fit injurm
The former applies only to cases arising out of the relationship of master and servant
or involving a contractual relationship, whereas the "maxim" applies independently
of any contract relationship. The court also pointed out that both of these defenses
are closely akin to contributory negligence, the distinction being that assumption of
risk and volenti non fit injuria may bar recovery even though the injured person may
be free from contributory negligence.
Host-Guest Statute-Implied Contract for Transportation-Emergency Doctrine-
Res Ipsa Loquitur. Vogreg v. Shepard Ambulance Service, Inc., 44 Wn2d 528, 268
P2d 642 (1954), was an action for injuries sustained as a result of falling out of the
defendant's ambulance while attempting to close the rear door in which the plaintiff's
husband, a paralytic, was riding. The trial court held that the plaintiff was a guest in
the defendant's ambulance, as a matter of law, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
inapplicable. Held: Whether the defendant impliedly contracted to transport wife
was a question of fact for the jury to determine under the purview of RCW 46.08.080,
and the existence of an emergency, viz., the unexplained opening of the rear door, did
not make the plaintiff's conduct necessarily unreasonable rendering res ipsa loquitur
inapplicable.
Contributory Negligence-Excusable Breach of Statute. Wood v. Chicago, M..
S.P. & P. Ry., 145 Wash. Dec. 561, 277 P.2d 345 (1954), was an action for injuries
sustained in a grade crossing accident which occurred before plaintiff reached signs
indicating the location of a speed zone and city limits. The issue presented was whether
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence per se because he exceeded the
maximum speed limit of twenty-five miles per hour within the limits of an incorporated
town, as prescribed by RCW 46.48.020. Citing previous Washington cases that indicate
a reluctance either to impose liability or to find contributory negligence for violation
of a statute as a matter of law where, except for the statute, the conduct would not be
deemed neglect, the court held that the absence of any notice or warning constituted
an excusable breach of the statute. The court also emphasized the ever increasing
reliance on the part of drivers today on signs -to warn them of any impending hazard.
[MI~AY
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Negligence-Instructions. Blassick v. City of Yakima, 145 Wash. Dec. 287, 274 P2d
122 (1954), was an action for injuries sustained by a pedestrian falling on an allegedly
defective alley crosswalk. The trial court instructed that the plaintiff to recover must
prove one or more acts of negligence "and that such negligence proximately caused or
materially contributed to the accident" The court pointed out that the materially
contributed test is synonymous with the substantial factor test proposed by the Restate-
ment of Torts, 1159, § 431- (1938), but the test should not be used either as a definition
of or a substitute for proximate cause in determining what is actionable negligence.
It was also pointed out that the materially contributed test should be confined to the
fact of causation alone, as distinguished from proximate cause which embraces all policy
considerations that limit liability even though the defendant's conduct is a materially
contributing cause.
Malicious Prosecution-Necessity of Special Injury. In Petrich v. McDonald, 44
Wn2d 211, 266 P2d 1047 (1954), the defendant had brought an action in Admiralty
with a libel for a foreclosure on a preferred ship mortgage and the issuance of an
attachment in rem against the plaintiff's vessel. The action was dismissed in Admiralty,
whereupon- the plaintiff brought this suit for malicious prosecution alleging injury as a
result of the attachment of his vessel. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff the
court held that while a seizure of property may afford occasion for the maintenance
of an action for malicious prosecution such seizure must constitute special injury
"which would not necessarily result in all like prosecution ." As the attachment of
the plaIntiff's vessel was a necessary incident to the defendant's maintenance of his
action in Admiralty such attachment did not constitute special injury, and on which a
suit for malicious prosecution could not properly be grounded.
Libel-Defenses of Qualified Privilege and Fair Comment or Criticism. In Cohen
v. Cowles Pub. Co., 145 Wash Dec. 241, 273 P.2d 893 (1954), an action for libel, the
court indicated that the defense of fair comment or criticism must be based on state-
ments of fact which are true, and not merely on facts which are reasonably believed to
be true. This is the first clear statement of the court's position. The rule was previously
considered in the dissenting opinion in Gaffney v. Scott Pub. Co., 41 Wn2d 191, 248
P.2d 390 (1952). For a discussion of the confusion surrounding the defenses of qualified
privilege and fair comment or criticism, see Comment, An Outline of the Law of Libel
in Washington, 30WAsH. L. REv. 36 (1955).
WIS AND ESTATES
Attestation of Wills-Personal Knowledge of the Genuineness of
Decedents Signature is Necessary. The case of In re Cronquist's
Estate' tests the meaning of attestation by witnesses as used in RCW
11.12.020, which provides, in part: "Every will... shall be attested
to by two or more competent witnesses, subscribing their names to the
n.... . In the Cronquist case, neither of the persons who signed
as witnesses saw the decedent affix his signature to the will nor did
the decedent acknowledge to either that he had so affixed his signature.
1145 Wash. Dec. 321, 274 P.2d 585 (1954).
2 RCW 11.12.020.
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